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THE ETHICS OF COST-CONTAINMENT:
BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE AND THE DOCTOR AS
PATIENT-ADVOCATE
BARRY R. FURROW*
INTRODUCTION
Physicians are feeling the heat of cost containment. Pres-
sures on doctors to contain costs have mounted - from hos-
pital and Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) adminis-
trators, from state and national government, from medical
staffs. Medicare payment reforms, corporate and insurer de-
mands, and market pressures have all come together to pres-
sure health care providers to cap escalating health care costs.
This article posits that such pressures to control costs are not
always counter to the patient's best interests and that the eth-
ical debate needs to incorporate the emergence of bureau-
cratic medicine and its sensitivity to cost.' The pressure to
reduce cost has intensified the tension felt by physicians as
they balance their ethical obligations to treat their patients
and their desires to maintain the financial health of their
health care institutions and their own financial security. The
line between pure medical decisions and economic decisions
has blurred.' The essence of the complaint is simply stated:
"... economic imperatives may weaken what should be a
strong fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient. A
physician cannot easily service his patients as trusted coun-
selor and agent when he has economic ties to profit-seeking
businesses that regard those patients as customers." 3
* Professor of Law, Delaware Law School, Widener University. B.A.,
Harvard College, 1967; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1971.
1. For an excellent discussion of incentives and various ways of pay-
ing physicians, see Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal
Implications of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 708 (1986).
2. P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 447
(1982); V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE?: HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL
CHOICE 145 (1974). See generally V. FUCHS, THE HEALTH ECONOMY (1986).
3. Relman, Practicing Medicine in the New Business Climate, 316 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1150, 1150 (1987). These "economic imperatives" can in-
clude not only profit-sharing arrangements, but also membership in HMOs
and employment in health care institutions, both profit and nonprofit, that
use a variety of financial incentives to control costs. See Weissburg & Stern,
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
The current ethical debate seems to revolve primarily
around middle class medicine, where physician autonomy in
treating patients has been most dramatically limited by new
modes of health care delivery and reimbursement. Prospec-
tive payment mechanisms have been implemented through
the federal Medicare program, but hospitals have applied
DRG categories across the board to their delivery of health
care. As hospitals struggle to contain costs, they have imple-
mented cost controls that affect a doctor's practice generally
and not just that segment involving Medicare patients."
Can Hospitals Reward Physicians for Reducing Unnecessary Utilization?, FED.
AM. Hosp. REV. 45 (Sept. - Oct. 1985). The authors note that "[s]ome sys-
tems are so complex that they utilize sophisticated computer programs
which analyze past performance and the severity of illness of individual pa-
tients, while others merely reward a physician if the hospital's costs for a
specific patient are less than the DRG payment." See also Morreim, The MD
and the DRG, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (June 1985).
4. Those treating the poor have always been aware of the rationing
aspects of the process. See generally Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case
Management, the Doctor-Patient Relationship, and the Politics of Privatization,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 915 (1986), particularly at 917-18 and accompany-
ing notes. Much of the problem discussed here does not address the real
"emergency" delivery of health care to under or uninsured patients, or
Medicaid patients. For whole classes of our population, the rationing di-
lemma experienced by the doctor is far more of a vise grip than a gentle
squeeze. The population affected thus makes a large difference to the ethi-
cal debate. With the poor, the level of scrutiny is at the political level, a
macroallocation question as to inadequacy of resources available as a pool
for the poor group. Schroeder, Strategies for Reducing Medical Costs by
Changing Physicians' Behavior: Efficacy and Impact on Quality of Care, 3 INT'L
J. TECH. ASSESS. IN HEALTH CARE 39, 47 (1987). "Whether attempts to re-
duce medical costs by changing physicians' behavior will harm patient care
depends upon the population affected and the services withheld. If the bur-
den of cost containment falls upon those who already have poor access to
care, then the quality of care will surely fall." Id. at 48. He concludes:
". .. how cost-containment measures affect the quality of care depends
upon their type and efficacy, the prevalence of unnecessary care, and the
vulnerability of the patients whose clinical services would be reduced, and
the type of services withheld." Id. See also Dallek, Commentary, 36 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 969 (1986).
Physicians serving the poor make more of the tradeoffs discussed here
than do those doctors who treat the middle class in HMOs or hospitals.
This article addresses the debate at the level of middle class medicine,
while conceding that the harder issues are raised by the scarce resource
problems involved in treatment of the poor.
Berenson has written that "it has not been unusual for me . . . to have
to negotiate with Medicare patients over my recommended drug regimens
in order to accommodate patients' very real budgetary constraints." Beren-
son, A Physician's Perspective on Case Management, 2 Bus. & HEALTH 22, 22-
23 (1985).
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I. OVERVIEW OF METHODS TO REDUCE MEDICAL COSTS
In 1982 Congress approved prospective reimbursement
of hospitals on a diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) basis for
Medicare.5 This system was designed to provide incentives
for cost containment by creating an administered price sys-
tem under which hospitals are paid a predetermined price for
services based upon an average cost calculation for a patient
with a particular diagnosis. This replaced the previous fee-
for-service system under which the hospital billed the federal
government for the actual charges incurred and was paid
with little risk of challenge. Medicare's new system covers
hospital care for Medicare patients in every state except New
Jersey, Maryland, New York, and Massachusetts.6 Some pri-
vate insurers have also adopted some version of it as well to
control their reimbursement costs.
Financial institutional arrangements in hospitals also seek
to control and channel physician behavior in cost-saving di-
rections. Such "cost constraints" are "a source of pressure
upon clinical decisionmaking through hospital rules or moni-
toring systems which tie physician salary, staff privileges, or
other benefits to effective control of costs."' The evidence
suggests that the most effective mode of changing medical
practice is the alteration of the financial incentives that affect
physicians. That is precisely the goal of incentive systems and
institutional designs, such as HMOs. Strategies for altering
physician behavior have ranged from education, feedback,
regulatory approaches such as Certificates of Need (CON),
insurance coverages, to financial incentives, either within hos-
pitals or inherent in structural forms such as HMOs.'
A. Ethical Dilemmas Posed by Cost Containment
The ethical tensions confronting the physician in an era
of cost-containment are complex. The conflicts experienced
by the physician may vary in intensity, depending upon the
source of cost pressures and the nature of the institution.
5. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, s.101, 96 Stat. 324, 331 (1982) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1986)).
6. 50 Fed. Reg. 24,366, 24,446 (1985). These four states have re-
ceived waivers under 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1986) to operate their own cost
control systems under Medicare.
7. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the
Screws, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 985, 989 (1986).
8. See generally Schroeder, supra note 4, at 45.
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The range of financial incentive schemes is quite extensive.
Thus, prospective payment schemes such as the Medicare
DRG system do not order the doctor or the hospital not to
treat or hospitalize a patient. Rather the message is that the
provider can do what it wants, but will only get paid whatever
the categories allow. Given the need to balance a budget, in-
stitutional incentives to follow the payment categories are
strong.
Incentive systems in some institutions tie physician per-
formance to level of utilization in a variety of ways. Capita-
tion systems such as HMOs put physicians at risk by conscious
design. The capitation principle means that payment is deter-
mined in advance for each subscriber to the HMO, and the
HMO will lose money if its costs per patient exceed the
amount they have collected. Physician gatekeepers attempt to
discourage overutilization in the HMO; the norms of practice
of physicians in HMOs tend toward lower levels of utilization
generally.10 Staff privileges may be indirectly tied to overu-
tilization as well.1 Physician-owned clinics and other medical
centers likewise provide very direct and strong incentives for
physicians to practice profitable medicine. Overall, cost con-
siderations have become an integral part of medical
practice.' 2
9. See Furrow, supra note 7, at 990.
10. The literature on practice patterns in prepaid group practices
supports the hypothesis that diagnostic and treatment patterns differ from
fee-for-service settings. See Pineault, The Effect of Prepaid Group Practice on
Physicians' Utilization Behavior, 14 MED. CARE 121 (1976); Dorsey, Use of Di-
agnostic Resources in Health Maintenance Organizations and Fee-For-Service
Practice Settings, 143 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1863 (1983); Hartzema and Chris-
tensen, Nonmedical Factors Associated with the Prescribing Volume Among Fam-
ily Practitioners in an HMO, 21 MED. CARE 990 (1983); Yelin, Henke, &
Kramer, A Comparison of the Treatment of Rheumatoid Arthritis in Health
Maintenance Organizations and Fee-For-Service Practices, 312 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 962 (1985).
11. See Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 244, 465
N.E. 2d 554 (1984), where a hospital denied a staff physician's reappoint-
ment. The hospital inquiry concentrated on the doctor's excessive use of
lung scans, medications, tests, pacemakers, and pulmonary angiograms.
The doctor's peers also testified that his excessive testing resulted in 30%
higher costs to the institution.
12. See generally Luft, Economic Incentives and Clinical Decisions, in THE
NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT 102 (B. Gray ed. 1983); Egdahl & Taft, Financial Incentives to
Physicians, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 59 (1986).
For a discussion of hospital responses to the new competitive environ-
ment, see Waldholz, Most Hospitals Quickly Learn to be Profitable, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 28, 1985, at 6, col. 1. See also PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COM-
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Critics of using economic incentives to change physician
behavior are concerned about the desirability of the end re-
sults of such behavioral changes on health care delivery and
quality of care. Alexander Capron worries, for example, that
exposing physicians to financial risks through incentive sys-
tems and prepaid plans will exacerbate access problems for
significant percentages of our population that are already un-
derserved. He writes: "Capitation programs, packaging of
services, and prepaid arrangements such as HMOs have a
built-in disincentive to accept the sickest and poorest patients,
the very ones who have the hardest time obtaining health
care.""3 Thus, before we implement a variety of incentive sys-
tems and cost constraints, we must be satisfied that the physi-
cian-patient relationship will still function and that patient
care will not suffer as a result.
B. Rationing
The specter of physicians consciously engaged in ration-
ing at the bedside has excited much commentary." Of
course, rationing of a scarce supply of health care resources is
MISSION, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 52 (Feb. 1986).
13. Capron, Containing Health Care Costs: Ethical and Legal Implica-
tions of Changes in the Methods of Paying Physicians, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
708, 752 (1986).
14. See Bayer, Callahan, Fletcher, Hodgson, Jennings, Monees,
Sieverts & Veatch, The Care of the Terminally Ill: Morality and Economics, 309
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1490 (1983); Morreim, The MD and the DRG, 15 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 30, 36 (1985). As the reimbursement purse strings have
tightened at all levels, physician awareness of the tradeoffs has become
acute. Fuchs writes:
Increasingly, physicians are being asked to resolve this problem;
that is one reason why the issue of "rationing" takes on a new
urgency. The pressure to be more economical in the provision of
care will force physicians to make decisions that are contrary to
the best interests of individual patients, even though these deci-
sions may make a great deal of sense from the viewpoint of society
as a whole. Moreover, pressure to control costs will raise explicitly
the question of who gets how much care. In the past this question
was often answered implicitly by where the patient lived and
whether he could pay. In the future, in the interest of maintaining
equity while controlling costs, it may be necessary to withhold care
from patients who have ample income or complete insurance and
who therefore believe that they are entitled to "everything
possible."
Fuchs, The 'Rationing' of Medical Care, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1572, 1573
(1984).
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nothing new. Physicians have always engaged in the rationing
of health care, in the sense of distributing a limited supply.'"
This distribution was usually accomplished implicitly in a va-
riety of ways that concealed or disguised it. The choices that
a rural practitioner might offer her patient would be more
limited in many cases than those available to her urban coun-
terpart, both because of the lack of medical or institutional
resources, such as high technology diagnostic tools, and be-
cause of the income differentials among patients. Such com-
mon sense rationing has received legal approval in malprac-
tice case law." The ability of the consumer to pay within the
health care marketplace was the dominant mode of rationing
health care as recently as two decades ago, when more than
half of individual health care payments were made directly by
patients.1 7 -
Second, the geographic location of the patient made a
large difference in the quality of care available, since the acci-
dent of geography meant access to more or less hospital care
of varying quality and to specialists of various kinds. 8 The
inner city thus typically has few doctors, often foreign born,
counterbalanced in some cities ironically with powerful teach-
ing hospitals; the suburbs have physicians in an office prac-
tice; rural areas few practitioners widely scattered. 9
Third, definitions of diseases by physicians and insurers
affect reimbursement for such care. Denial of a treatment as
not "medically necessary" is a direct form of rationing of that
care. Controversies over reimbursement by insurers of psy-
15. See Fuchs, supra note 14.
16. Scarce resource problems are nothing new to medicine; caselaw
in malpractice cases reflects judicial sensitivity to resource variations in
medical practice. In Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985) for exam-
ple, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted the resource limitations exper-
ienced by a small town Mississippi practitioner. Hall followed the general
judicial practice of taking into account the locality, the nature of the health
care facility, and the proximity of specialists and special facilities in evaluat-
ing the medical standard of care. See also Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W.2d 370
(Ky. 1970); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 299A, Comment g. ("Allow-
ance must be made also for the type of community in which the actor car-
ries on his practice. A country doctor cannot be expected to have the
equipment, facilities, experience, knowledge or opportunity to obtain it,
afforded him by a large city.")
17. See Fuchs, supra note 14, at 1572.
18. Id.
19. See P. Starr, supra note 2, at 361-63.
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chotherapeutic services, sex change operations, or "experi-
mental" therapies have reflected this form of rationing.2"
Fourth, as Victor Fuchs comments, "the amount and
kind of care that physicians provide is still constrained by
how busy they are, what facilities, equipment, and auxiliary
personnel are available, how much training the physicians
have had, and the informal messages that they receive from
peers about what constitutes 'appropriate' care in any partic-
ular situation. ' 2' Rationing is still ubiquitous in the delivery
of health care services, although it may not be recognized or
defined as such in the practice of middle class medicine.
1. Third Party Payment Blunts Rationing Impact.
Intially, the growth of private and governmental third
party payment mechanisms reduced the role of patient in-
come as a rationing device. Beginning in the 1950's, the in-
creasing availability of health insurance through Medicare
and Blue Cross Blue Shield vastly improved middle class ac-
cess to medical care,22 although social values, geographic dif-
ferences, and skill and resource differences of health care
providers still result in significant variation in access to health
care. This emergence of government funded health care in-
surance had removed much of the decisionmaking tension
from both doctor and patient over the past two decades,
since cost did not have to be a factor in most treatment deci-
sions.23 The availability of third-party insurance thus became
the driving force behind the tremendous expansion of health
care expenditures in the United States, since ". . . when a
third party is paying, the patient will want additional care and
the conscientious physician will provide it, even though its
cost to society exceeds the benefit to the patient."2 ' The
prevalence of insurance has allowed access to care by a much
20. When I was in private practice in Boston, representing Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Massachusetts, the insurer's physician panel con-
sidered within one two year period such issues as the desirability of includ-
ing within a definition of "medical necessity" chemopapain treatment for
lower back pain and sex change operations. Given the long term cost of
these treatments, a decision not to provide coverage to subscribers of the
plans would make such treatments impossible for a large percentage of
those who desired them.
21. Fuchs, supra note 14, at 1572.
22. Fox, The Consequence of Consensus: American Health Policy in the
Twentieth Century, 64 MILBANK Q. 76, 84 (1986).
23. See Rosenblatt, supra note 4, at 917.
24. Fuchs, supra note 14, at 1572.
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larger percentage of the public, and has therefore served im-
portant social functions. It has also shielded both patient and
doctor from the need for careful scrutiny of the costs of the
services rendered.25
2. Cost Containment Reasserts Rationing Pressure.
The current "rationing" problem is now more strongly
felt by physicians in middle class practice because suddenly
rationing is again out in the open, rather than concealed by
structural and geographic differences. The HMO doctor
must now examine the necessity for the more expensive third
generation antibiotic rather than the cheaper ones available;
he must weigh the need for extended hospitalization of a pa-
tient. As hospitals try to reduce the volume of costly diagnos-
tic workups, doctors must face the uncertainty of less infor-
mation. Patients are being pushed out of hospitals earlier,
reducing the margin of safety that some physicians would
like. Doctors and ethicists are searching for strategies to
avoid physician responsibility for these cost-based decisions,
so-called "tragic choices" that, like the sun, cause discomfort
when looked at directly.28
C. Why Worry?
Why are we so worried about doctors and their dilem-
mas? Lawyers ration care for clients all the time, based pri-
marily on the client's willingness and ability to pay, unless the
suit is a contingency fee liability case. Are medical services
ranked higher on a hierarchy of social values and social needs
than legal care? Certainly most individual clients, except
criminal defendants, are not in life-threatening situations.
But neither are most consumers of health care. For those
doctor-patient encounters that involve debilitating diseases,
pain, or the prospect of long term disabilities, however, it is
understandable that we are concerned. Obstetrics, oncology,
treatment of heart disease and diabetes - all involve illnesses
25. See R. FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS: THE SEARCH FOR A
HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY 168 (1986). Fein gives a good account both of
the relationship of health insurance and rising health care costs, and the
benefits of such insurance.
26. G. CALEBRESI AND P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). These au-
thors were the first to discuss these dilemmas that lack clear answers, create
discomfort, and therefore lead to avoidance or concealment of the conflicts
through a variety of strategies. See also Dyer, Patients, Not Costs, Come First,
16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (1986).
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that can end badly. We are unhappy with the older system of
rationing based on ability and willingness to pay, an approach
that restricted access to care in an arbitrary fashion. The
closest legal analogy is state-paid defense of the indigent
criminal defendant, where we view access to legal services as
essential. The legal system is experiencing some movement
toward greater access to a range of legal services, with the
increasing availability of prepaid legal services offered by
some employers. The principle of access to necessary services
is an expanding notion in our culture, and the special claims
of medicine may soon be joined by other professional groups,
as society's definition of need expands.27 The discussion
which follows explores a number of ethical models in search
of a more satisfactory method of rationing health care
services.
II. ETHICS: A GUIDE TO ACTION
A. The Traditional Model
The delivery of health care inevitably involves ethical
problems. Ethics offers guidance to help resolve specific
problems, based upon the application of general moral prin-
ciples. Applied ethics offers "procedures and standards for
deliberation and justification '"28 in dealing with problems of
health care delivery and therapeutic practice. 9
Ethical discussions have traditionally focused on the phy-
sician-patient relationship and dilemmas of the treatment set-
ting and the immediate life in peril. This ethical focus has
excluded broader concerns affecting present and future pa-
tients (will medical resources be left for them, after the par-
ticular patient is aided?), or society (is the zealous treatment
of the particular patient necessary or desirable or too
27. See L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1985) for a development of the
cultural forces that have raised our expectations.
28. T. BEAUCHAMP and J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
ix (2d ed. 1983).
29. As H. Tristam Engelhardt writes:
The health professions are practiced within a terrain of concepts
and values that presupposes particular relations between concepts
and values for which philosophers function as the geographers
... .Philosophers can call attention to neglected features, for-
gotten relationships, and unforeseen contradictions. Philosophers
can aid in better mapping and in critically evaluating the concep-
tual and value commitments involved in particular actions and
choices.
H. ENGELHARDT, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 10-11 (1986).
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costly?).30 The explanation for a patient-centered ethic has
been that ethics derived from physicians worried about par-
ticular problems they faced, reflecting an individualistic per-
spective of the "good doctor" and his or her concerns in the
treatment setting.31
Four principles are generally applied to medical inter-
ventions: nonmaleficence, beneficence, autonomy, and jus-
tice. The principle of nonmaleficence derives from the
maxim primum non nocere, translated as "above all, or first, do
no harm." It overlaps conceptually with the principle of be-
neficence, but is usually treated as a distinct principle, as it
overrides beneficence in some situations. The principle of
nonmaleficence is defined by Beauchamp and Childress to
mean that "one ought not to inflict evil or harm (what is
bad)." 2 Nonmaleficence resonates for the lawyer in many
tort liability rules based on a standard of care that aims to
avoid harm to others through one's affirmative acts.3 Like
many tort rules, it requires that "agents be thoughtful and
act carefully," minimizing risks created toward others."
Nonmaleficence asks what risks are posed by the interven-
tion, and what level of stress and indignity will the patient
have to endure. It is a first principle, prima facie valid. One
who seeks to violate the principle carries a heavy burden of
justification.
The principle of beneficence goes one step beyond the
principle of nonmaleficence. It derives from a specific moral
30. See generally ETHICS AND HEALTH POLICY xix (R. Veatch and R.
Branson, eds. 1976).
31. See Jonsen and Hellegers, Conceptual Foundations for an Ethics of
Medical Care, 17, in VEATCH AND BRANSON, supra note 30.
In sum, code ethics, as they presently exist, might be called the
archeological ruins of a doctrine of medical virtue. The codes are,
in their present form, collections of pragmatic physician-patient
covenant.
Id. at 22.
32. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, supra note 28, at 108.
33. Tort law has long adopted the distinction betweep omission and
commission, refusing to recognize any duty to rescue absent a special rela-
tionship. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314, illustration 1 (1965).
The nonfeasance principle and its exceptions are well traced in D. DOBBS,
TORTS AND COMPENSATION 406-461 (1985). See also Levmore, Waiting for
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirma-
tive Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986); Lipkin, Beyond Good Samaritans
and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to
Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252 (1983).
34. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, supra note 28, at 110.
35. Id. at 106-47.
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relationship of the doctor and the patient. It addresses the
affirmative obligations required of a moral actor, and not just
acts that must be avoided. Beauchamp and Childress sum it
up with obligations: "One ought to prevent evil or harm
.... One ought to remove evil . . . .One ought to do or
promote good.""6 The principle of beneficence thus allows the
actor more discretion than nonmaleficence, requires less risk-
taking, and is more dependent upon roles and relationships."'
The principle of patient autonomy forces the physician
to look at the patient's desires and fears. What is the patient's
desire, once informed of the balance of probabilities? The pa-
tient as autonomous decisionmaker is entitled to make the
cost tradeoffs. How should a doctor respond if a patient has
no insurance and is unwilling to pay for an expensive proce-
dure, or simply decides to forego a treatment after making
his or her own cost tradeoffs? Must the doctor be satisfied
with giving the patient less medical care than is possible, and
less than would in a qualitative sense help the patient?"
The principle of justice is the most difficult to define.
Philosophers and ethicists have not reached agreement on
the common grounds for a principle of justice. 9 The ques-
tion can be put in a cost containment setting, but it conceals
as much complexity as it uncovers in the process. Does the
expected benefit to this particular patient justify the cost in
resources to the community? Justice in the allocation of
36. Id. at 108.
37. Id. at 158.
38. As A. Donabedian writes:
[I]n real life, we do not have the option of excluding monetary
costs from the individualized definition of quality. Their inclusion
means that the practitioner does for each patient what the patient
has decided his circumstances allow. In so doing, the practitioner
has discharged his responsibility, provided that he has helped the
patient to discover and use every available means of paying for
care.
I A. DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS As-
SESSMENT 27 (1980). Donabedian foreshadows the role of the physician as
patient-advocate, recognizing that the doctor may have an obligation to
help the patient search for reimbursement. We will take up this theme
again in the discussion of the Wickline case, see infra text accompanying
notes 92-104.
39. T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, supra note 28, at 186-9 1.
40. The inquiry into the distributive principle to guide analysis of
justice is far too complex to treat in this article. T. Beauchamp and J. Chil-
dress list five alternative principles:
1. To each an equal share
2. To each according to his need
19881
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scarce resources is often broken down into problems of
macroallocation and microallocation. Macroallocation deci-
sions look at decisionmaking at the level of government and
institutions, asking how much of social resources "should be
used for various goods, including health-related expendi-
tures,_as well as how priorities are to be established for the
distribution of these resources. There are at least two aspects
of such decisions: What quantity of our total available finan-
cial resources should be allotted to health-related enterprises
(such as medical research, routine services, clinical practice,
and health education), and of the total amount so allocated,
what quantity should go to which specific projects (such as
cancer research and dialysis programs)?""1
Microallocation decisions occur at the level of implemen-
tation, when health care providers decide who should get
what.
B. The Strong Version of Beneficence
The principle of beneficence is at the heart of much con-
temporary bioethical discussions of cost containment and the
physician. Current bioethical discussions begin with an estab-
lished doctor-patient relationship. The roles are already in
place, the physician has a contractual relationship with the
patient, and now it is a question of treatment choices and cost
tradeoffs. Current bioethical discussions often adopt as a gov-
erning principle what I will term "strong" beneficence. A
doctor must do all that is within his or her power to help the
patient, regardless of cost."2 Medical ethicists speak of the
special duties of the doctor in his relationship to the patient,
characterizing the doctor as a special friend to the patient,
with the bonds of loyalty that we normally subsume within
the meaning of friendship.' Hans Jonas describes the duty
owed by the physician to a patient as a "sacred trust," an ob-
ligation to ignore social and other concerns which interfere
with the care of the specific patient."' The Principles of Med-
3. To each according to his effort
4. To each according to societal contribution
5. To each according to merit
Id. at 187. A rich philosophical tradition supports each principle of justice.
41. Id. at 201-202.
42. See Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical Reallocation of Resources, 16 HAs-
TINGS CENTER REP. 32 (1986).
43. Charles Fried has developed this analogy most forcefully, in C.
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 179 (1978).
44. Note the intensity of Jonas' description:
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ical Ethics of the American Medical Association (AMA) are
almost as forceful in stating the principle of beneficence as
dominant:
A physician has a duty to do all that he can for the
benefit of his individual patients without assuming total re-
sponsibility for equitable disbursement of society's limited
health resources. To expect a physician in the context of
his medical practice to administer governmental priorities
in the allocation of scarce health resources is to create a
conflict with the physician's primary responsibility to his pa-
tients that would be socially undesirable. 5
The AMA principles place cost concerns second: "While phy-
sicians should be conscious of costs and not provide or pre-
scribe unnecessary services or ancillary facilities, social policy
expects that concern for the care the patient receives will be
the physician's first consideration."4 The Ethical Code of the
World Health Association states: "A Doctor owes a patient
. . .all the resources of his science."4 Levinsky puts it even
more strongly: "[p]hysicians are required to do everything
In the course of treatment, the physician is obligated to the pa-
tient and no one else. He is not the agent of society, nor of the
interests of medical science, nor of the patient's family, nor of his
co-sufferers, or future sufferers from the same disease. The pa-
tient alone counts when he is under the physician's care . . .[T]he
physician is bound not to let any other interest interfere with that
of the patient in being cured. But manifestly more sublime norms
than contractual ones are involved. We may speak of a sacred
trust; strictly by its terms, the doctor is, as it were, alone with his
patient and God.
Jonas, Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, in CON-
TEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICs 411, 417 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds.
1978).
45. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL COUNCIL: PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS 2.03 (1984).
46. Id. at 2.08.
47. A philosophically expanded version of these ideals is described by
Norman Daniels as the "ethics of agency." A physician's services are lim-
ited by requirements that:
clinical decisions be competent, respectful of the patient's auton-
omy, respectful of the other rights of the patient (e.g. confidential-
ity), free from consideration of the physician's interests, and unin-
fluenced by judgments about the patient's worth.
Daniels, Why Saying No to Patients in the United States is So Hard: Cost Con-
tainment, Justice, and Provider Autonomy, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1382
(1986).
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that they believe may benefit each patient without regard to
costs or other societal considerations."' 8
1. Justifying the Principle and Strong Beneficence.
Justifications for a strong beneficence principle of per-
sonal care and the zealous pursuit of the patient's interests
fall into three general categories. First, the relationship of
personal care with the physician as patient-advocate fosters
patient trust, confidence and candor, feelings that are valua-
ble in themselves as part of a special social relationship akin
to friendship. 4' Such patient attitudes are arguably also con-
ducive of a better, more effective physician-patient relation-
ship. Bedside cost-cutting, it is feared, will cause deterioration
in the doctor-patient relationship from the patient's perspec-
tive." Marcia Angell has argued that "[a]nything short of full
efforts to heal the individual patient . . . must involve an ele-
ment of deception - an ethically untenable condition."51
The patient expects total loyalty, and the doctor-patient rela-
tionship "would not endure any other stated purpose.''5"
Second, physician motivation to heal will be enhanced by
putting the specific patient's needs ahead of economic consid-
erations extrinsic to treatment of the specific patient. The
motivation of doctors to care for their patients will otherwise
be weakened if they are forced into a case-by-case tradeoff of
the patient's interests and the institutions, theirs or soci-
ety's.5 8 It is this vision of the physician dedicated to her pa-
48. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1573-
74 (1984); see also Veatch, DRGs and the Ethical Reallocation of Resources, 16
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 32-40 (1986).
49. See C. FRIED, supra note 43.
50. See generally Morreim, supra note 3. Victor Fuchs writes:
Physicians have traditionally idealized the ethic of duty to their
patients, and patients have derived considerable comfort from be-
lieving that physicians hold to this ethic . . . . Patients' percep-
tions of a conflict of interest can lead to an erosion of the trust,
confidence, and candor that are essential elements in .the physi-
cian-patient relationship and in the delivery of high-quality care.
Fuchs, The Counterrevolution in Health Care Financing, 316 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1154, 1155 (1987); see also T. Beauchamp and J. Childress, supra
note 28, at 213.
51. Angell, Medicine: The Endangered Patient-Centered Ethic, 17 Has-
tings Center Rep. 12 (Supp. 1 1987).
52. Id. at 13.
53. See Fuchs, supra note 14, at 1573:
For physicians to have to face these trade-offs explicitly every day
is to assign to them an unreasonable and undesirable burden. The
commitment of the individual physician to the individual patient is
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tient that is often at the heart of objections to cost con-
straints. The loyalty of the physician to patient leads the
physician, the argument continues, to pursue that patient's
interests zealously. Critics fear that muddying the purity of
that loyalty will lead the physician into a motivational conflict
of interest, resulting in poorer care for the patient.54 Critics
argue that admitting cost considerations into clinical practice
will lead to a standard of practice like that observed by Aaron
and Schwartz in England, where the standard of care argua-
bly has shifted downward, diminishing the quality of care
delivered.55
The pure fiduciary model of doctor and patient
presumes freedom from financial limitations, no conflicting
role tensions, and access to the available tools for diagnosing
and treating.51 As with any model, it assumes away some real
world limitations as part of defining the ideal. And as with
one of the most valuable features of American medical care. It
would therefore be a great mistake to turn each physician into an
explicit maximizer of the social-benefit/social-cost ration in his or
her daily practice.
id.
54. See Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Law-
yer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
55. See H. Aaron & W. Schwartz, THE PAINFUL PRESCRIPTION: RATION-
ING HOSPITAL CARE (1984). Interestingly, however, Aaron and Schwartz
thought that American medicine could learn something from the British
experience, as do many British physicians:
Good medicine would call for fewer tests when the gain in infor-
mation is slight and for less surgery and less use of costly drugs
when the advantage of expensive over inexpensive therapies is
small. In short, U.S. doctors would begin to build into their norms
of good practice a sense of the relation between the costs of care
and the value of the benefits from it. They would be led to weigh
not only the medical aspects of diagnosis and treatment but also
the peculiar circumstances of each patient: his age, his underlying
health, his family responsibilities, and his chance of recovering
enough to resume a normal life.
This process would require a far-reaching change in attitude for
the many American doctors who believe it unprofessional, if not
immoral, for doctors to consider costs in deciding what actions to
take on behalf of patients.
Id. at 127.
For a strong statement by a leading British physician of the importance
of medical training in health economics, see Lister, Resource Allocation: Edu-
cating for the Rationing of Care, 3 INTL. J. TECH. ASSESS. IN HEALTH CARE 91
(1987).
56. Rosenblatt has examined the changes in the AMA Code of Ethics
over the past three decades, and has pointed up some fascinating changes.
See Rosenblatt, supra note 4, at 923-28.
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any model, it is only valuable if it can be expanded to con-
sider as many commonly occurring real world constraints as
possible. A behavioral analysis of physician behavior, as of
any human actor's behavior, reveals that their motivations
are a complex mixture of forces. Eisenberg, who has written
extensively on the forces affecting medical decisionmaking,
observes that "[p]hysician decision making is a complex inter-
action of attempts to satisfy the physicians' personal desires
and those of the patient . . . .A substantial part of the physi-
cian's satisfaction with practice is fulfilled by serving success-
fully as the patient's advocate. '0 7 He also notes however that
such decisionmaking has substantial components of self inter-
est in terms of desires to retain the patient, keep income
high, and calm physician anxiety. 8
Doctors are often ignorant of the price of medical care
services and the portion that patients must pay. 59 Doctors
may adjust their utilization to maintain income. 60 They may
also consider the portion of their fee paid out of pocket by
the patient. Doctors are influenced by cost in the number of
tests they prescribe as well, with 24-38 percent of test order-
ing price sensitive, and the rest driven by clinical considera-
tions.61 Eisenberg notes:
This behavior of the physician as the patient's eco-
nomic agent may not be entirely altruistic. The physician
may serve as the patient's advocate in order to retain the
patient as a client. By this argument, the more competitive
57. J. EISENBERG, DOCTORS' DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL
CARE 57 (1986).
58. Eisenberg describes six components of the physician as agent:
(1) the physician will defend the patient's economic well-being,
although the economic interests of the two may conflict;
(2) clinical factors play a role, and the role as healer is central;
(3) doctors are influenced by their patient's preferences;
(4) concern about malpractice suits and resulting defensive
practices are also driven by both patient preferences and
physician anxieties;
(5) patient's characteristics;
(6) patient's convenience.
Id.
59. Eisenberg & Williams, Cost Containment and Changing Physicians'
Practice Behavior: Can the Fox Learn to Guard the Chicken Coop? 246 J.A.M.A.
2195, 2195 (1981).
60. See J. EISENBERG, supra note 57 at 15-18, summarizing the studies
that looked at physician ability to induce demand and finding strong
linkages.
61. Id. at 59.
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the medical market is, the more the physician should act as
the patient's agent. In addition to reducing out-of-pocket
expenses for the patient, the physician who acts as the pa-
tient's economic agent by reducing the number of nonphy-
sician expenses, such as tests, drugs, or hospital days, may
also be making it possible for the patient to spend more of
his health care dollar on physician fees.62
These observations are not intended as a pejorative comment
on the purity of the ethical model of the physician as patient
advocate and agent. They are rather intended to point out
that the model must account for existing motivational forces,
as well as new economic pressures, if it is to be a useful ac-
tion-guide.
Third, critics worry that physician discrimination against
patients may result, on the basis of age or other characteris-
tics, as doctors employ a calculus that aims to conserve social
resources where the treatment is likely to be "wasted," as
with a short survival rate for an elderly patient.6 This may
then reinforce existing biases in medical decisionmaking, par-
ticularly negative biases toward the old, or members of stig-
matized minorities such as homosexuals. 4 This is a legitimate
worry in evaluating any cost containment approach.
2. Qualifying the Principle of Strong Beneficience.
Why should we not offer the patient everything that is
available in the arsenal of medicine? The parade of horribles
presented by the critics in the face of cost containment is
enough to terrify even the strong of heart. Yet the job of an
ethical analysis is to "explore the terrain," and search for
weaknesses in a principle even while sympathizing with its
general thrust. First, even the strongest statement of the
principle of beneficence stops short of promising everything.
The principle operates within a world of scarce resources
from the outset, since even the most expansive statement
concludes that everything must be done which is "within the
power of the physician." The first limit on the absolutist
statement of the principle of beneficence therefore reflects a
world of substantial variation in the tools available to the in-
dividual physician. The strong statements of the principle
somehow miss this. Levinsky is representative:
62. Id. at 60.
63. Levinsky, supra note 48, at 1574.
64. Id.
19881
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
Physicians can help control costs by choosing the most
economical ways to deliver optimal care to their patients.
They can use the least expensive setting, ambulatory or in-
patient, in which first-class care can be given. They can
eliminate redundant or useless diagnostic procedures or-
dered because of habit, deficient knowledge, personal finan-
cial gain, or the practice of "defensive medicine" to avoid
malpractice judgments. 6
The qualifications here are notable: "first-class care;" "opti-
mal care." Levinsky and others simply dodge the cost ques-
tion while giving it lip service, by telling the physician to
make nonchoices. Angell likewise seems to concede a role for
physicians in cost containment when she writes that "the pro-
fession should take an active role in containing costs, but it
should do so without participating in efforts that would deny
patients beneficial care."6 Yet the cloak of "beneficial care"
means that Angell likewise dodges the hard decisions as to
uncertainties in treatment and statistical medicine.
Second, tests of efficacy and quality of care impose a set
of limits that are more important than the ethical maxims
and their defenders seem willing to acknowledge. Medical
care has costs, not only in the direct financial charges in pro-
viding such care, but in the risks of overtreatment, iatrogenic
effects, and cascade effects.6" Failing to think through diagno-
sis and treatment with these iatrogenic risks in mind raises a
serious ethical objection, on a par with violating the specific
norm of beneficence to the patient in peril.
Third, patient preferences, protected by the principle of
autonomy, are significant constraints on intervention. The
advocates of expanded informed consent in medical practice
suggest that physicians must learn to share information about
treatment uncertainties and the risks of medical interventions
with their patients.6" Such sharing of information is likely, as
Jay Katz contends, to lead to a substantial reduction in medi-
cal intervention generally. 69
65. Id. at 1575.
66. Id.
67. See Furrow, supra note 7.
68. See J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984)
for the best argued statement of this position in favor of patient autonomy.
69. Katz goes on to observe that:
Acknowledgement of uncertainty about intervention or delay to
patients would compel both to share responsibility for the decision
ultimately made .... Both must learn that there is considerable
value in living with uncertainty and not resolving it peremptorily
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Fourth, uncertainty in medical practice must be forth-
rightly acknowledged. The practice of medicine is considera-
bly more complicated than the abstract statements of the eth-
ical model. In many situations, the doctor as "special friend"
might well conclude that he should resist a futile desire to
continue to treat when further intervention is useless. Even
the extreme statement of the duty - that the doctor should
let nothing interfere with the patient's interest "in being
cured" - suggests the natural limits on such a duty. The un-
certainty in much medical practice, the evidence of medical
practice variation, the tendencies toward intervention when
in doubt - all lead us toward a need to set limits when the
possibility of "cure" is uncertain and the costs of intervention
to both the patient and others are evident. Jennett aptly sums
up these concerns in his five tests for deciding whether to
reject a medical intervention, four of which force close scru-
tiny of the specific treatment by the physician. A treatment
should be rejected if it is:
Unnecessary - because the desired objective can be
achieved by simpler means ...
Unsuccessful - because the patient has a condition too
advanced to respond to treatment ...
Unsafe - because the complications outweigh the prob-
able benefit ...
Unkind - because the quality of life after rescue is not
good enough or its duration for long enough to have justi-
fied the intervention.
Unwise - because it diverts resources from activities
that would yield greater benefits to other unknown
patients.7 0
Only Jennett's last test, "unwise," invokes the principle of
justice and the dilemmas of rationing, while the others are
tests that the treating physician should legitimately apply in
the treatment of each patient.
Fifth, the purity of the strong beneficence model has
never even been approached, given the complexity of incen-
tives acting upon both doctor and patient. American doctors
may choose whom to serve, based upon ability to pay among
in favor of action.
Id. at 196-197.
70. B. JENNETT, HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE: BENEFITS AND BURDENS
174 (1986).
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other considerations. 1 Once the relationship is formed, cost
is not supposed to enter. 2 That is, the doctor's economic in-
terests are to be excluded, although the patient's economic
status may be important.7" A doctor is not expected to pay
for medicine or treatment that a patient cannot afford, nor to
impose treatment on a patient who refuses it on the basis of
an inability to pay.
The role of uncertainty in medical decision making may
also lead, as Wennberg reports, to substantial medical prac-
tice variation from region to region."' Given the substantial
uncertainties surrounding much of medical treatment, physi-
cians who want to provide optimal care are often influenced
by forces outside the doctor-patient interaction - primarily
the influence of peers and professional leaders, but also ef-
fects of commercial sources such as drug and medical equip-
ment companies.m Patient taste and desires, the prices paid
and patient resources, as well as clinical need - all shape de-
mand." Patient demand likewise is a part of the physician's
decision as to treatment, and as Eisenberg notes, "[t]o the ex-
tent that patient demand can be generated by altering pa-
tients' belief, the information that physicians provide patients
gives them potential control over the amount and type of pa-
tient demand for medical services. '
Optimal care is not just defined by the physician with ref-
erence to an ideal static internalized model of good medical
treatment. Other influences can be powerful shapers of treat-
ment. The physician's ethical obligation to further the princi-
ple of beneficence requires that he or she consciously recog-
nize and sort out the variety of influences on treatment
choices and eliminate the improper ones.
71. See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (AMA), PRINCIPLES OF MEDI-
CAL ETHICS § VI (1980), in T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 28, at
332.
72. See, e.g., Levinsky, supra note 48, at 1573.
73. See Rosenblatt, supra note 4, at 926 n.43.
74. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for
Action, 3 HEALTH AFF. 6 (1984). See also McPherson, Wennberg, Hovind &
Clifford, Small-Area Variations in the Use of Common Surgical Procedures: An
International Comparison of New England, England, and Norway, 307 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1310, 1312-13 (1982).
75. J. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 68.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 67.
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C. Expanding the Model
1. The changing face of medical practice.
The traditional model need be neither discarded nor rig-
idly defended. The rationing dilemma will continue to be a
real one, but we need to restate the magnitude of the prob-
lem. While some physicians chafe at the suggestion of statisti-
cal and cost effective medicine,7 8 there is surely room for sub-
stantial improvement in the analysis of medical care, its
benefits and effectiveness.
a. Statistical medicine.
Medical technology is not just machines, but also a way
of thinking statistically, of placing the patient in a risk cate-
gory for a disease, and basing diagnosis and treatment on the
behavior of a statistically significant group.79 The tension be-
tween the patient as unique and as member of a statistical
pool is inherent in modern clinical medicine. The concept of
the patient as unique, a special individual in peril, misses
much of a modern medical progress. 80 The patient as a mem-
ber of a statistical grouping means that the very act of defin-
ing and diagnosing the patient's medical problem has moved
the patient from a unique being to the status of the member
of a class.8 ' The ethical model of medical practice has largely
78. Jonsen, Teaching the Ethicsl Technology Interface, 3 INTL. J. TECH.
ASSESS. IN HEALTH CARE 61, 63 (1987).
79. See B. JENNETT, HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE: BENEFITS AND BUR-
DENS (1986); S.J. REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY (1981).
80. Jonsen, supra note 78, at 63. Jonsen writes:
[a]s physicians think through diagnosis and devise therapy, they
do so technologically. This is, of course, an enormous benefit to
the patients: their treatment is not based on the random experi-
ence and untested intuition of their doctor. At the same time, the
certitude of statistical thinking is limited: decisions based upon
that thinking depend really on a profoundly moral factor: the risk
of being wrong that physicians and patient are able and willing to
tolerate. Because many physicians fear that risk, they repudiate
the statistical in favor of a "do everything" attack. They are the
physicians who will always take the "last ditch" stand, who see no
case as hopeless, who will pursue every diagnostic clue regardless
of cost. Other physicians, will accept the risk, hew close to the sta-
tistical and, in so doing, appear cold and careless of the individual
patient.
Id.
81. For a discussion of the patient as a unique entity, a "particular,"
see Gorovitz & MacIntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility, 1 J. MED. &
PHIL. 51 (1976).
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coincided with the older clinical model of medical practice,
which views each patient in isolation in relation to the treat-
ing doctor. Statistical medicine poses a sharp ethical problem
akin to the rationing problem: with a rationing choice, the
patient may get worse because of the use of lower cost care
or cheaper drugs; with a statistical analysis, the patient may
get worse because he was not treated, or suffered the adverse
side effects of treatment, that only a small probability of pa-
tients were likely to suffer. Medicine therefore always poses
constant ethical tradeoffs.82 Yet the house of medicine has
not collapsed because of physician motivational failures or pa-
tient withdrawal of trust. The problem has rather been that
clinicians have failed to pay enough attention to probability
estimates. Data has often been lacking, or ignored when
available.8 Even when a proponent of a strong beneficence
principle recognizes the value of sorting out effective from
ineffective practices, or practicing careful statistical medicine,
the effect on physicians is viewed as destructive. Thus Veatch
writes that ". . . [a]sking physicians to be cost-conscious .. .
would be asking them to abandon their central commitment
to their patients." '84
b. Cost effective medicine.
Cost is always a part of the clinical decision, in the sense
that a cost is incurred when a diagnosis is missed or an error
results in an injured patient. If a treatment goes badly, it will
cost money - to the patient, to the institution, and to the
society. The simplest medical decisions inherently involve
risk-benefit calculations. Explicit cost-effectiveness calcula-
tions of medical technologies are desirable whenever possi-
ble.85 The problems in defining, detecting and eliminating
waste and achieving cost-effective calculations are substantial,
but the medical model nonetheless will in the long run be
enriched by such efforts, just as statistical medicine has en-
riched clinical practice. 86
82. See Jonsen, supra note 78.
83. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, 3
HEALTH AFF. 74, 85 (1984).
84. Veatch, supra note 48, at 38.
85. See generally Doubilet, Weinstein & McNeil, Use and Misuse of the
Term "Cost Effective" in Medicine, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 253 (1986); K.
WARNER & B. LUCE, COST-BENEFIT AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IN
HEALTH CARE (1982).
86. For a detailed discussion of the problems with so-called "waste
theory" and medical technology, see Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment
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Doctors need an ethic that factors in cost-effectiveness in
deciding when medicine is bad medicine. Such a cost-sensitive
approach is essential, as Lester Thurow writes,
not simply because it has absolutely no payoff or because it
hurts the patient - but also because the costs are not justi-
fied by the marginal benefits . . . Health-care costs are
being treated as if they were largely an economic problem,
but they are not. To be solved, they will have to be treated
as an ethical problem.8 7
The beneficence based model needs to be expanded to ac-
count in a rich way for both statistical and cost-effective
medicine. The strategy for handling such cost issues has gen-
erally been to shift the decisionmaking to the level of
macroallocation - how much money should we pay as a soci-
ety for treatment of certain classes of people, and with what
range of tools;8 or to impose a variety of administrative lay-
ers to shield the clinician from the cost considerations.89
These strategies for extricating physicians from the horns of
their rationing dilemma have value; we do need to face re-
source choices as a society, rather than overloading the doc-
tor who treats the poor with rationing choices. As a strata-
gem to leave the doctor as a pure clinical decisionmaker,
however, they are both doomed to failure and blind to the
complexity of bedside decisionmaking.
2. The transition to bureaucratic medicine.
A third amendment to the beneficence model is needed,
and the notion of bureaucratic medicine captures it. Most
health care is now delivered by physicians within institutions,
whether HMOs or hospitals or clinics. 90 This care is paid for
by third party insurance, government insurance, or employ-
ers.91 The physician is now subject to a range of direct pres-
and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
778 (1986).
87. Thurow, Learning to Say "No", 311 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1569,
1571-72 (1984).
88. See Angell, supra note 51, at 13.
89. See Veatch, supra note 42, at 32.
90. This point has been well discussed by Paul Starr, supra note 2, in
discussing the emergence of the modern hospital.
91. This statement is largely accurate for the middle class. By con-
trast, Rosenblatt notes, ". . . public insurance for poor patients under the
Medicaid program is typically characterized by restrictive eligibility and
substandard coverage, reimbursement, and administration." Rosenblatt,
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sures and indirect incentives that were foreign to practice
thirty years ago.92 The recent decision in California in the
Wickline case allows us a chance to test and amend the ethical
model of strong beneficence in light of reimbursement cost
constraints. The hope is to strengthen the patient-centered
model, and narrow the range of difficult rationing cases.
III. BUREAUCRATIC MEDICINE
Can a doctor ever be held responsible, legally and mor-
ally, for choosing a less expensive treatment or a shortened
hospital stay, if the patient ends up getting worse because of
the doctor's choice? Can the doctor argue cost limitations as a
defense, or shift the burden onto the third party payer who
denied payment? The case of Wickline v. State93 presents the
tradeoff between cost containment and a clinically desired
course of action, looking at prospective utilization review and
its downside. The case deserves extended discussion, for it
presents both a cross section of the world of bureaucratic
medicine and a chance to scrutinize the role of the doctor as
the patient's economic agent and advocate.
A. The Wickline Case
Ms. Wickline had back and leg problems, and in 1976
she was treated by Dr. Daniels, a physician in general family
practice. She failed to respond to physical therapy and was
admitted to Van Nuys Community Hospital and examined by
Dr. Polonsky, a specialist in peripheral vascular surgery. He
diagnosed Leriche's Syndrome, a condition caused by ob-
struction of the terminal aorta due to arteriosclerosis. He rec-
ommended surgery. Ms. Wickline was eligible for Medi-Cal,
California's medical assistance program. Dr. Daniels submit-
ted a treatment authorization request to Medi-Cal, which au-
thorized the surgery and 10 days of hospitalization. Dr.
supra note 4, at 917.
More than twenty million Americans are completely without health in-
surance of any kind, including Medicaid. Iglehart, Medical Care of the Poor
- A Growing Problem, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED. 59 (1985).
92. See discussion of cost constraints, supra notes 5-12. See also
Capron, supra note 13, for a full discussion of the range of incentives that
affect physicians.
93. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986), repub'd at 192
Cal. App. 3d 1630, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, rev. granted - Cal. 3d. __
727 P2d 753, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560, dismissed, remanded & ord'd pub'd
Cal. 3d __, 741 P.2d 613, 239 Cal. Rptr. 805 (Cal. 1987).
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Polonsky then performed the surgery, which involved remov-
ing a part of Ms. Wickline's artery and substituting a syn-
thetic artery. She then developed a clot and a second opera-
tion was required. Her recovery after these two procedures
was described as "stormy."'
Ms. Wickline was to leave the hospital on January 17,
1977. Dr. Polonsky decided on January 16 however that it
was "medically necessary" for her to remain in the hospital
for another eight days beyond the scheduled discharge date.
He was worried about infection, and also about his ability to
respond quickly to any emergency that might develop in her
legs. He therefore filed a Medi-Cal form 180. The physician
puts on this form the patient's diagnosis, significant history,
clinical status and treatment plan, in order to permit the
Medi-Cal representative - either an "on-site nurse" and/or
the Medi-Cal physician consultant - to evaluate the request.
The form as filled out by Dr. Polonsky was complete and ac-
curate, and was signed off by Dr. Daniels and submitted to
the nurse responsible for completing such forms. The nurse,
Doris Futerman, felt that she should not approve the entire
eight-day extension. She therefore telephoned the consultant,
Dr. Glassman, who authorized only four days beyond the
original discharge date. He could not later recall why, and
the form contained no reasons for disapproval by either Fut-
erman or Glassman. After reviewing the form, however, Dr.
Glassman indicated that he had rejected the request for sev-
eral reasons:
...there was no information about the patient's tem-
perature which he, thereupon, assumed was normal; noth-
ing was mentioned about the patient's diet, which he then
presumed was not a problem; nor was there any informa-
tion about Wickline's bowel function, which Dr. Glassman
then presumed was functioning satisfactorily. Further, the
fact that the 180 form noted that Wickline was able to am-
bulate with help and that whirlpool treatments were to be-
gin that day caused Dr. Glassman to presume that the pa-
tient was progressing satisfactorily and was not seriously or
critically ill. 95
He did not consult with a specialist in peripheral vascular sur-
gery before making his decision, although such specialists
were available as consultants. The plaintiff argued that Dr.
94. See 228 Cal. Rptr. at 663-64.
95. Id. at 666.
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Glassman's decision was based upon irrelevant symptoms, fail-
ing to focus on those symptoms that an "ordinary prudent
physician" would find relevant.
Doctors Polonsky and Daniels each then wrote discharge
orders based on the limited four day extension. As the court
described their actions, "[w]hile all three doctors were aware
that they could attempt to obtain a further extension of Wic-
kline's hospital stay by telephoning the Medi-Cal consultant
to request such an extension, none of them did so."96
Ms. Wickline was discharged. At the time of her depar-
ture from the hospital, her condition appeared stable, with
no evidence that her leg was in danger. Dr. Polonsky testified
that he felt his hands were tied as to further appeals on his
part:
...he felt that Medi-Cal Consultants had the State's
interest more in mind than the patient's welfare and that
the belief influenced his decision not to request a second
extension of Wickline's hospital stay. In addition, he felt
that Medi-Cal had the power to tell him, as a treating doc-
tor, when a patient must be discharged from the hospital
... . He testified that had Wickline's condition, in his
medical judgment, been critical or in a deteriorating condi-
tion on January 21, he would have made some effort to
keep her in the hospital beyond that day even if denied au-
thority by Medi-Cal and even if he had to pay her hospital
bill himself.97
The medical experts in the case agreed that Dr. Polonsky was
within the standard of practice in discharging Wickline on
January 21.
Within a few days of her arrival home, Ms. Wickline had
problems with her right leg, which had begun to change
color. She was ordered back to the hospital on January 30,
nine days after her last discharge. Attempts to save the leg
were unsuccessful, and on February 8, Dr. Polonsky ampu-
tated Wickline's leg below the knee, to save her life. On Feb-
ruary 17, because of the failure to heal, her leg was ampu-
tated above the knee. Dr. Polonsky testified that if she had
remained in the hospital, he would have observed the leg's
change in color, realized that a clot had formed, and ordered
her back into surgery to reopen the graft to remove the clot.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 667.
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He testified to a reasonable medical certainty that she would
not have lost her leg if she had remained in the hospital.
This lengthy recital of facts prefatory to the court's deci-
sion reveals that the Medi-Cal consultant took a casual ap-
proach to his review, and that the treating physicians acted
passively in the face of the initial Medi-Cal rejection. Medi-
Cal then argued that the decision to discharge was made by
each of the plaintiff's three doctors, and Medi-Cal had no
part in the discharge. Both sides agreed that "[t]he decision
to discharge is . . . the responsibility of the patient's own
treating doctor."98 The chief Medi-Cal consultant testified
that if any of the three doctors had filed another request for
an extension based upon their determination of medical ne-
cessity, such a request would have been given.
The California court held that Medi-Cal could not be re-
sponsible, on the facts of the case. Their decision is most in-
teresting for its suggestion as to future liability in prospective
utilization review cases. They addressed the obligations of
both the treating physicians and the bureaucratic reimburse-
ment reviewers. Their first proposition was that a patient
may recover in cases of undertreatment related to reimburse-
ment decisions.
The patient who requires treatment and who is harmed
when care which should have been provided is not provided
should recover for the injuries suffered from all those re-
sponsible for the deprivation of such care, including, when
appropriate, health care payers.9
The fiscal payers must do their job according to proper care-
ful standards of review.
Third party payers of health care services can be held
legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions
result from defects in the design or implementation of cost
containment mechanisms as, for example, when appeals
made on a patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are
arbitrarily ignored or unreasonably disregarded or
overridden.100
So design and implementation procedures become important
in avoiding negligence liability. But the doctor is not off the
hook, whether the payer's procedures are well designed or
not. The doctor as patient advocate emerges from the deci-
98. Id. at 670.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 670-71.
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sion in a central way, an advocate who must tackle the admin-
istrators and the payers, in the pursuit of resources for his
patient.
However, the physician who complies without protest
with the limitations imposed by a third party payer, when
his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his
ultimate responsibility for his patient's care. He cannot
point to the health care payer as the liability scapegoat
when the consequences of his own determinative medical
decisions go sour."'
Such a role is not a comfortable one for doctors raised in a
tradition of unlimited third party reimbursement for medical
treatment. The doctors treating Ms. Wickline manifested
their discomfort by showing anger and a curious kind of pas-
sivity. They said on the one hand that such an "early" dis-
charge was within the realm of reasonable treatment. On the
other hand, they said that even if it were not, they were help-
less in the face of the bureaucrats.
There is little doubt that Dr. Polonsky was intimidated
by the Medi-Cal program but he was not paralyzed by Dr.
Glassman's response nor rendered powerless to act appro-
priately if other action was required under the circum-
stances . . . . All the plaintiff's treating physicians con-
curred and all the doctors who testified at trial . . . agreed
that Dr. Polonsky's medical decision to discharge Wickline
met the standard of care applicable at the time. Medi-Cal
was not a party to that medical decision and therefore can-
not be held to share in the harm resulting if such decision
was negligently made." 2
The court concluded:
. . . what is at issue here is the effect of cost containment
programs upon the professional judgment of physicians to
prescribe hospital treatment for patients requiring the
same. While we recognize, realistically, that cost conscious-
ness has become a permanent feature of the health care sys-
tem, it is essential that cost limitation programs not be per-
mitted to corrupt medical judgment.13
What does the court mean, "corrupt medical judgment?"
The court is responding to the ambivalent response of Dr.
101. Id. at 671.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 672.
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Polonsky, who could be heard to say that in a world of unlim-
ited reimbursement, he would have kept Ms. Wickline in the
hospital for observation for another four days. Since the
medical testimony, however, supported Polonsky's concur-
rence in discharge before a full eight day extension, the State
of California was not liable, as a matter of law, for the inju-
ries suffered by Ms. Wickline.
B. Extending the Wickline Case: The Role of the Physician as
Patient Advocate
What does this case mean, to the doctor, the patient, and
to society? First of all, the court allows clinical judgment to
trump cost-oriented discharge judgments by third party pay-
ers. But at what point does the marginal benefit from added
hospital days cease to outweigh the cost? At least when the
medical profession agrees, so that a doctor requesting added
time for his patient would not be acting as a reasonable and
prudent doctor.
Second, and most important, a physician is expected to
be a patient's advocate, trying to squeeze out of tight-fisted
payers the level of care which he feels is necessary. He must
engage in bureaucratic appeals and negotiation, exhausting
rights of appeal when the utilization review process has re-
jected his recommendation. If he discharges a patient against
his better medical judgment when reimbursement was de-
nied, he risks liability for malpractice.
The appellate arguments for the State of California in
Wickline suggested that the state designed the reimbursement
system with a very conservative bias in the expectation that
doctors, acting as patient advocates, would lobby in the tough
cases. The attorney general argued in Wickline that the state's
prospective review system was constructed with a very con-
servative mandate, and that doctors were expected to appeal
decisions. The assumption was that the provider would al-
ways request an extension if the Medi-Cal consulting physi-
cian made a mistake.104 This line of argument suggests an
104. The appellate brief for the State of California argued:
In sum, each of the three doctors knew that the consultant was
just a "telephone call away." In light of these facts, could not
Medi-Cal justifiably assume that the doctor or nurse or hospital
charged with the responsibility of acting in the best interests of
the patients would always at least telephonically request an exten-
sion [reversal of the original Medi-cal decision] when the need
arose?
Quoted in Miller, Rationing Care: The Consequences of Cost-Driven Decision
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ethical and legal obligation on the physician to provide com-
plete information to the utilization reviewer, and to act as an
effective advocate for the patient, seeking approval of care
the physician has decided is medically necessary. The evi-
dence of shoddy record keeping in Wickline suggests that the
review system was premised on the assumption that the at-
tending physician would appeal a denial, and then adequate
documentation would be produced and properly considered.
This may not be the best way to run a railroad, or a health
care reimbursement system, but it does place the doctor in
the important role of patient advocate.
Third, if the third-party utilization review body negli-
gently reviews the record and denies payment prospectively,
it may be liable for patient harm "when appeals made on a
patient's behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily ig-
nored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden." But we
have a burden of proof problem at this point. Does the court
mean that the third-party payer can be liable only when the
initial request is denied, or only when the doctor as patient
advocate has pushed further, with documentation, and then a
second denial occurs? The liability issues in Wickline raise a
host of questions beyond the scope of this paper.
The physician, as medical ethics has so passionately
stated it, is the agent of the patient. In that capacity it makes
sense to demand that he fight the battle with cost-sensitive
administrators. This is not a familiar or happy role for most
doctors, who have been accustomed under fee-for-service
medicine to a free hand in diagnosis, treatment, and hospital-
ization. Wickline is an important decision. Its principles are
applicable to any utilization review situation, including hospi-
tal implementation of DRG's and third-party insurer prospec-
tive review. It reveals judicial lack of sympathy for the argu-
ment that cost constraints should easily get a physician off the
hook for patient injury, or that sloppy utilization review is
tolerable. It also exposes the transition in medical practice
-from an autonomous mode of practice for doctors, largely
free from external review on grounds of cost - to a period
of eroding autonomy in which the doctor as clinician must
also be the doctor as advocate and bureaucrat."0 5 As a mem-
Making, PEER REV. & L. 17 (ABA Forum Committee on Health Law, May 8-
9, 1986).
105. See Starr, supra note 2, particularly at 446-48. Starr notes that
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ber of a bureaucracy that has its own imperatives of contin-
ued survival of the institution, his financial and other per-
sonal interests are closely interwoven with those of the
medical and reimbursement bureaucracy and its success.
Finding an ethical perspective that properly handles the
emerging complexity of the physician-patient-institution rela-
tionship requires sorting out the various roles of the physi-
cian in his or her overlapping universes of decisionmaking,
and developing criteria for deciding when one role trumps
another. The voices of the medical professional in distress
can sidetrack us from the needs of larger society, or even the
financial well-being of the health care provider of which the
doctor is a part. We need to analyze these roles and test out
strategies for best handling cost - quality tradeoffs in medi-
cal treatment.
IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR ETHICAL MEDICINE
A. Strategies for Coping with Cost and Quality
Rationing of health care is unavoidable, at all levels,
from the political arena to the clinical bedside. Physicians and
ethicists often seem to concede this, but then demand that it
be done at a level that leaves the physician's motivations un-
fettered by cost concerns.' 6 Bedside conflicts cannot be
avoided, but they can be confronted and minimized through
a variety of strategies. I would argue in fact that physician
awareness of the whole range of resource and institutional
limits on the delivery of care will improve the care delivered.
I therefore propose four strategies for physician advocacy in
refining the beneficence principle in the world of cost con-
straints, each one occurring at a different level of decision-
making as to resource use.
1. Policy Making - the Physician as Lobbyist.
Major resource allocation decisions are made at the state
and federal levels. Government at all levels finances a tre-
mendous variety of health care institutions and programs. In
1985, for example, government spending accounted for
$147.5 billion, or 39.7 percent of the total national expendi-
physicians will become subdivided into "owning, managing, employed, and
independent physicians." Id. at 447. Medical and business decisions will be-
gin to merge, and there will be "increasing corporate influence over the
rules and standards of medical work." Id.
106. See, e.g., Veatch, supra note 42, at 38.
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tures on personal health care.' The design and implementa-
tion of such programs as the DRG system for Medicare'
and Medicaid programs for the poor'0 9 have a major effect
on the resources available to large segments of our popula-
tion for health care services. Major expensive treatment ap-
proaches are typically selected in our society at the level of
legislative appropriations or regulatory approval within ad-
ministrative agencies, as witnessed by federal reimbursement
for kidney dialysis at present and limited coverage of heart
transplants."0 Certificate of need programs and other regula-
tory approaches have made some equipment or drugs un-
available in the arsenal of diagnosis and treatment."' The
federal DRG program likewise constrains the options availa-
ble to hospitals by shifting to them the burden of managing a
limited payment pool, instead of the blank check of earlier
107. B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 602 (1987) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH
LAW]. The authors describe the range of programs:
The federal government provides health care to veterans in 172
veterans' hospitals and in the community; to the active and retired
military and their dependents in 168 military hospitals and
through the civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uni-
formed Services (CHAMPUS); to the nearly one million native
Americans in over 600 hospitals, health centers and clinics run by
the Indian Health Service; and to a variety of special groups
through block grants to the states for maternal and child health,
alcohol and drug abuse treatment, mental health, preventive
health, and primary care. States provide health care through
mental and tuberculosis hospitals, university hospitals, aid to the
medically indigent (AMI) and worker's compensation programs.
County and local governments operate local hospitals and AMI
programs. By far the largest public health care programs, how-
ever, are the federal Medicare program, which spent $70.5 billion
dollars on personal health care in 1985, and the state and federal
Medicaid program, which spent $39.8 billion. (602)
Id.
108. For a description of the Diagnosis-Related Groups (DRG) pro-
gram, see id. at 455-464; Phillips & Wineberg, Medicare Prospective Payment:
A Quiet Revolution, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 13, 29-39 (1984).
109. See HEALTH LAW, supra note 107, at 602-68.
110. Id. at 672.
111. The Certificate of Need programs were a primary tool of health
planning, which aimed to constrain the supply of health care resources.
The federal government has largely abandoned health planning and the
CON programs, but in several states it is still active. See generally P. JOSKoW,
CONTROLLING HOSPITAL COSTS: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION 76-
99 (1981); Salkever & Bice, The Impact of Certificate-of-Need Controls on Hos-
pital Investment, in ECONOMICS AND HEALTH CARE 294 (J.B. McKinlay ed.
1981).
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reimbursement structures." 2 Some procedures, such as organ
transplants, have been handled as experimental, and there-
fore controlled at least partially through a licensing approach
where medical devices are involved."' Once such policies are
set, the pressures on the clinician are relieved, and he can
say, "I will treat you with all the resources within my power,
but I lack certain powers." These constraints are preexisting
and he is not forced to withhold them on a case-by-case ba-
sis." 4 But the physician can work to expand the arsenal of
treatment choices by lobbying at the legislative level. Doctors
have shown a willingness to politicize the tort liability system
by aggressive lobbying for malpractice reform. The same en-
ergy directed toward fair policies of treatment, research and
financing would be well spent. Physicians are often skeptical
that money saved in one area of medical practice through
stringent medical cost cutting and careful management will
112. For an excellent description of the DRG system and its
problems, see Dolenc and Dougherty, DRGs: The Counterrevolution in Fi-
nancing Health Care, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 19 (1985).
113. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) governs medical
drugs, defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g) (1982), and medical devices, defined
in 21 U.S.C. § 32 1(h) (1982). Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-60 (1982), the FDA regulates new drugs and devices
prior to their entry into interstate commerce.
New surgical procedures and treatments, such as those developed for or-
gan transplantation, fall into a regulatory gap. Human experimentation
may be subject to regulation by the Department of Health and in whole or
part by the federal government. These regulations require that the institu-
tion sponsoring the research create Institutional Review Boards (IRBs).
These IRBs evaluate the research to determine whether human subjects
might be "at risk" and if so, how to protect them. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101
(1985). If the institution does not receive federal funds nor use a medical
device of a new or experimental sort, then clinical experimentation may
proceed without any sort of government scrutiny.
114. Fried makes a useful point: the physician represents one level of
obligation; the bureaucrat another.
Since the department of health, the legislature, and maybe even
the director of the hospital do not have the kind of personal rela-
tions with patients that call into being the rights in personal care,
respecting these rights is not a constraint upon persons at that
level. Since administrators and bureaucrats are dealing in large,
impersonal statistical groups, the primary moral norms applicable
to relations with such abstract entities are precisely those of effi-
ciency and justice. To be sure, planners and bureaucrats must not
direct individual physicians to violate personal rights, but ques-
tions about the enjoyment of those rights can only be determined
rationally on norms of efficiency and equity.
Fried, Rights and Health Care - Beyond Equity and Efficiency, 293 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 241, 244 (1975).
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be diverted to other social uses than health care. They may
disagree with congressional or regulatory choices made. They
must therefore operate as lobbyists."'
2. Protocol Setting - The Physician as Specialist.
Most clinical policies are established in a decentralized
way by a flow of reports in the medical literature, at medical
meetings, and in peer discussions. 1 6 This process may lead to
the proliferation of new technologies and treatments before
adequate proof of effectiveness is in." 7 Where consensus is
lacking, medical practices vary widely, with adverse implica-
tions for the cost of care.' Morreim proposes a collective
enterprise wherein physicians "share information and ideas
concerning the best ways to revise their routine medical prac-
tice." ' 9 This suggests the need for medical education and
professional efforts at standard setting, attempting to define
quality treatment as effective treatment, thereby trimming
certain unproven or marginally effective but costly proce-
dures. Doctors should be pressured toward discriminating use
of high-cost high technologies, particularly of diagnosis. We
know that the costs of diagnostic tools may add up to as much
as one quarter of total hospital costs and a substantial portion
of ambulatory care costs."0 Clinical decisionmaking needs to
move toward quantitative approaches that give the physician
the ability to compare and assess the necessity of various diag-
nostic interventions."' Morreim hopes that such a protocol
revision approach will help to identify the basic effective ele-
ments of good care, so that physicians "will be able to tell us
when we must confront genuine scarcity.""' The physician
115. Fried talks of the professional as citizen, with obligations to
lobby for values he holds dear. See Fried, supra note 54. Angell proposes
that the medical profession "should certainly be involved in informing de-
bates over health policy." See Angell, supra note 51, at 13.
116. See Eddy Clinical Policies and the Quality of Clinical Practice, 307
NEw ENG. J. MED. 343 (1982).
117. See Mehlman's discussion of various technologies and their diffu-
sion, in Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A
Critique of Waste Theory, 36 CASE W. RES. 778, 785-788 (1986).
118. Wennberg, supra note 74, at 7.
119. Morreim, The MD and the DRG, 15 HASTINGs CENTER REP. 30,
37 (1985).
120. See Anzerp and Griner, Teaching Quantitative Approaches to the
Use of Diagnostic Tests and Procedures, 3 INTL. J. TECH. ASSESS. IN HEALTH
CARE 27 (1987).
121. Id.
122. Morreim, supra note 119, at 37.
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as specialist needs to be conscious of the origins and justifica-
tions of medical standards of care, in order to select the
proper approaches.
3. Local Administrative Practices - The Physician as
Bureaucrat.
The practice of medicine within institutions is subject to
substantial scrutiny by hospital administrators and by the hos-
pital committee structure mandated by the Joint Commission
on the Accreditation of Hospitals.12 Utilization review com-
mittees, such as Professional Review Organizations (PROs)
organized under the Medicare program to control cost while
improving quality, view costly overutilization of tests and hos-
pitalization as directly related to bad medicine. Professional
Review Organizations are under contract with the federal
government to evaluate institutions serving Medicare popula-
tions (as most hospitals do).124 Internal staff review commit-
tees are also proving sensitive to costly procedures. Thus in
Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp. ,125 a hospital denied reap-
pointment to a staff physician after the doctor's peers on a
utilization review committee determined that a pattern of ex-
cessive use of lung scans, medications, tests, pacemakers and
pulmonary angiograms existed, and that the excessive testing
resulted in both poor quality care and in 30 percent higher
costs to the institution. The staff privilege cases often reflect
peer sensitivity to the cost-quality interface in the evaluation
of peer conduct within institutions. Studies have shown the
importance of physicians and administrators working to-
gether in the decision-making process, in order to bring to-
gether concerns for both costs and quality.2 6 Greater physi-
cian involvement in hospital decisionmaking has been linked
to lower costs . . . and higher quality of care. 12 7 The more
123. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals
(JCAH) accredits eighty percent of the hospitals in the United States. See
supra note 107, at 345. It establishes standards for the conduct and organi-
zation of the accredited hospital's medical staff. See The Accreditation
Manual of the Joint Commission on Accreditation, Medical Staff, Standard
10.1 (1986).
124. The PRO statute is 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320c-1320c-12. For a good
discussion, with portions of a PRO contract, see Health Law, supra note
107, at 420-35.
125. 125 Il. App. 3d 244, 465 N.E.2d 554 (1984).
126. Neuhauser, Budgeting Incentives for the Appropriate Use of Medical
Technology, 3 INTL. J. TECH. ASSESS. IN HEALTH CARE 173 (1987).
127. Shortell, Physician Involvement in Hospital Decision Making, in THE
19881
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
aware physicians are of the decisionmaking process within a
health care institution, and its performance generally, the
lower the costs in specific medical departments. Schroeder
summarizes studies during the 1980's which concluded that
"greater physician participation in hospital decision making is
positively associated with higher quality of care, as measured
by such indicators as severity-adjusted death rates and post-
surgical complication rates."128 Shared collaborative decision-
making models within the hospital hold out promise for im-
proving both efficiency and quality. Clinical participation in
bureaucratic decisionmaking does not come easy to physi-
cians who are used to a perpetual state of hostility with ad-
ministrators. Consideration of administrative and cost con-
cerns is equally disquieting. But the evidence, even though
tentative,129 suggests that collaboration may reduce rather
than intensify the ethical dilemmas feared by clinicians. The
goal is enhanced physician consciousness of how health care
is delivered within the institution. Any principle of benefi-
cence requires full awareness of what works for the patient,
how it works, and what it costs compared to other
approaches.
4. Clinical Applications - The Physician as Advocate.
Strategies one through three may minimize or avoid the
ethical dilemmas posed early in this article. They present the
physician as citizen, as specialist, and as peer collaborating in
hospital decisions, through existing committees and other ar-
rangements. Strategy four places the physician in the clinic,
testing the limits of the strong beneficence principle in the
face of bureaucratic medicine. The physician as clinical advo-
cate has several audiences: peers, patients, and the bureau-
cracy (now also increasingly made up of peers).
Such advocacy forces acknowledgement of the conflicts
in medical practice, rather than trying to conceal the conflicts
by moving them to other levels of decisionmaking. Physician
motivation in a patient-centered model may be conflicting,
but the conflict is better out in the open for examination and
discussion. The flaw in the model of strong beneficence is the
assumption that clinical medicine is improved by putting
blinders on the doctor. The evidence - from studies of in-
NEW HEALTH CARE FOR PROFIT: DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN A COMPETITIVE
ENVIRONMENT 73, 90 (B. Gray, ed. 1983).
128. Id. at 91.
129. Id.
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formed consent, °30 medical practice variation,'131 the diffusion
of medical practice"3 2 - is that the physician may practice
better medicine, even if his anxiety level is higher, by facing
all of the uncertainties and conflicts inherent in modern bu-
reaucratic medicine. At least the fight is out in the open.
B. The Principle of Advocacy Beneficence
The Wickline case presents the tension between benefi-
cence and justice most sharply. To what extent is it the duty
of the physician to the society of which he is a member to
consider the effect of his decisions on social resources? The
case places us in the middle of a microallocation problem. A
routine procedure (as compared to an experimental one) is
performed, and the allocation issue is solely length of hospi-
talization. Over large numbers of patients, excess hospitaliza-
tion drains resources away from other uses. Should the doc-
tor be able to argue cost constraints in this case? Should he
keep the costs of excess hospital use in mind as he evaluates a
treatment decision for a specific patient? 3 It is preferable, as
Veatch has argued, not to ask the physician to directly trade
off patient welfare and social resource use.3 4 However, the
four strategies I have proposed avoid this direct trade-off
whenever possible. The macroallocation issues are handled at
the political level, with the physician as lobbyist advocating
his perspective. The cost-efficacy issues are handled at the
specialty level, through more systematic protocol setting. The
treatment alternatives are handled at the institutional level,
with a collaborative decisionmaking model allowing doctors
and administrators to advocate their interests and justify
their positions. The cost issues at the bedside will remain, but
if the physician as lobbyist, specialist and committee member
has been involved in standard setting, then he may be better
able to live with the treatment choices. If not, he is the clini-
cian as advocate, aware of the reimbursement structure and
130. See Novak, Changes in Physicians' Attitudes Towards Telling the
Cancer Patient, 241 J. A.M.A. 897 (1979); J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1985).
131. See Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal
for Action, 3 HEALTH AFFAIRS 6, 9 (1984).
132. See Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty,
3 HEALTH AFFAIRS 74 (1984).
133. See Fried, supra note 54, for the argument that the professional,
whether lawyer or doctor, must focus only on his client's, or patient's,
interests.
134. Veatch, supra note 41, at 38.
1988]
JOURNAL OF LAW, ET"HICS & PUBLIC POLICY
capable of energetically advocating his client's interests, in
contrast to Dr. Polonsky's failure to advocate Ms. Wickline's.
A spirit of advocacy replaces the physician passivity described
in Wickline, if the doctor learns to acknowledge that he is part
of the-whole apparatus of health care delivery, and not the
solitary and autonomous clinical decisionmaker.
Consider the facts of Wickline. The patient is qualified to
receive reimbursement, as an eligible Medi-Cal patient. The
doctor faces uncertainty in treatment, after the second opera-
tion, and would like the patient to spend extra time in the
hospital. Consider the following hypothetical encounter be-
tween physician and patient.
"Ms. Wickline, your leg seems to be okay now, but we can
never be sure with these cases. It's important that we keep
an eye on it for possible infection, impairment of blood
flow, or other problems. Unfortunately, your Medi-Cal ben-
efits are up tomorrow, and after that you have to stay in the
hospital at your expense."
"Dr. Polonsky, what should I do?"
What choices can Dr. Polonsky now offer Ms. Wickline?
First, he must be her advocate, as Donabedian suggests, help-
ing her search for every form of payment within her grasp if
he feels strongly that further observation is needed. He must
therefore practice bureaucratic medicine, learning the by-
ways of reimbursement politics and the mechanisms by which
he can push the system in a problem case. But this does not
mean simply manipulating or gaming the system. It means
working collaboratively, following strategy three, to convince
others to change policies that have placed him in the present
dilemma. He must advocate, convince, before he can prevail.
Second, he can further the principle of autonomy by discuss-
ing the risks fully with her. Katz' interactive model of in-
formed consent would require Dr. Polonsky to share medical
uncertainty with Ms. Wickline. Dr. Polonsky in Wickline was
practicing statistical medicine, in which Ms. Wickline stood a
low probability chance of a complication, given, her stormy
recovery. If he is really up against the cold stone wall of reim-
bursement cutoff, it may be that she will herself try to pay for
extended hospitalization. He may teach her to observe her
own condition and learn the signs and symptoms of a devel-
oping problem. Or he can help to arrange for a cheaper
home health care arrangement to follow up her problem. 3 '
135. Patient choice can be advanced through a variety of mechanisms
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We can still imagine cases in which the doctor as advocate
fails to convince the payer that the extra care was necessary;
the patient is unable to pay for it out of pocket; no alterna-
tives are available; and the patient suffers. If the standard of
medical practice supported the doctor's position, then the
payer was at fault, acting in a fashion flawed both ethically
and legally. If the doctor was practicing aggressive medicine,
wanting to do all that was possible, even though his peers
would have taken the small chance of adverse side effects by
doing nothing, then it is not clear that the institution has vio-
lated the principle of beneficence by tying his hands. The
doctor in this case may have to live with statistical medicine,
recognizing that conservative (and lower cost) approaches
may sometimes produce bad results. But so may too much
medical intervention.186
CONCLUSION
Beneficence requires a far more complicated look at the
nature of medical practice, its costs and benefits, and more
active involvement by physicians in the process of setting
both medical and reimbursement standards. The principle of
beneficence remains as the cornerstone of the doctor-patient
relationship, as it should. We must however be careful not to
confuse an eroding concept of medical autonomy, the clini-
cian in splendid isolation with the patient, with legitimate jus-
tifications of beneficence. Beneficence means helping the pa-
tient, and the version of advocacy beneficence presented here
requires more peer involvement and bureaucratic collabora-
tion than older versions of the principle allow. And yet, as
the world of health care delivery changes, so must the princi-
ple of beneficence. It may be that the patients will come out
of the transition to bureaucratic medicine better off than we
have expected, if physicians are willing advocates for their
patients and collaborators with the bureaucracy of which they
are, after all, an essential part.
that allow cost to be explicitly considered by the patient at the point of
entry into the particular health care system: co-insurance, deductibles,
medication ceilings, HMO entrance explanations. This arguably will fur-
ther patient autonomy, within the confines of possible choices.
136. For a well-argued attack on thoughtless medical interventions,
see E. RoBIN, MATTERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: RISKS vs. BENEFITS OF MEDICAL
CARE (1984).
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